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In order to identify an individual, participants and analysts must interpret signs uttered 
or displayed by that individual, or signs uttered or displayed by others with respect to that 
individual.  At the moment of utterance or display, however, participants and analysts 
often do not know what context is relevant for interpreting a sign of identity.  We can 
interpret signs of identity only as they get recontextualized by subsequent discourse 
(Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Goffman, 1976; Silverstein, 1992).  Although there are of 
course many formulaic, predictable interactions, participants and analysts can generally 
identify an individual only over time, as a pattern of mutually-presupposing indexical 
signs comes to establish that the sign of identity in question did in fact have a determinate 
meaning (Silverstein, 1998; Wortham, 2001a). 
 
In a classroom, for example, when an adolescent says something like “if I go shoot 
you in the head” to a teacher during discussion of an academic point, we might think that 
we can identify the student as threatening or at least as disruptive.  With more information 
about the context, however, our interpretation of the sign might change.  If the utterance is 
embedded in a hypothetical discussion, in which the teacher and other students have also 
imagined immoral acts of this sort in order to clarify an academic argument, the student 
may be a productive contributor.  Other utterances from the conversation, in addition to 
nonverbal signs, will be essential to interpreting any such sign of identity.  In most cases, a 
set of signs will come consistently to presuppose one meaning or another for the sign—
because several signs will all indicate a similar sort of identity for the participant in 
question.  At that point, a plausible interpretation for the signs of identity will gel. 
 
But plausible interpretation of a sign of identity does not depend only on other signs 
from within the speech event.  It also matters, for instance, how that student has been 
identified in the classroom up to this point in his or her academic career.  Has the student 
been identified as hostile and disruptive, or as congenial and promising?  Answering this 
question requires data from earlier in the academic year, and perhaps data about decades-
old institutionalized mechanisms for sorting and identifying students.  We might imagine a 
radial geometry of potentially relevant context, centered on the speech event and the focal 
sign of identity.  Identifying the speaker identified by that sign will require indexical links 
to various aspects of the context, aspects located at different points in the radial geometry. 
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This speech event-centered view of social identification has limitations, however, 
because the social identification of an individual is rarely accomplished, outside of ritual 
events, in one discursive interaction.  Individuals get socially identified across a chain 
(Agha, 2003; in press) or trajectory (Dreier, 2003) of events, as subsequent events come 
increasingly to presuppose identities signaled in earlier ones.  This view focuses not on 
one utterance or one event, together with context relevant to that focal point, but on the 
trajectory across which an individual moves.  The interpretation of each point in the 
trajectory only occurs with respect to a set of mutually-presupposing indexical signs that 
co-occur within a speech event.  But the chain of events across which an individual gets 
identified is more than just several pieces of the relevant context as seen from the 
perspective of one utterance or speech event.  The chain or trajectory must itself be the 
focal point of analysis, at least when analyzing the process of social identification, because 
identification generally occurs across events. 
 
Just as signs of identity cannot normally be interpreted at the moment of utterance, 
without subsequent relevant context, events of identification often cannot be interpreted 
without reference to prior and subsequent events along a trajectory.  In order for 
participants and analysts to interpret whether an event of identification in fact 
characterizes an individual more generally, they must attend to subsequent events in which 
that individual gets identified.  Only as interpretable signs of identity from several events 
come to presuppose each other does a robust identity for an individual emerge.  This 
chapter describes how social identification can become increasingly robust, across 
discursive interactions, by tracing the identification of an American high school student in 
one classroom across an academic year.  The chapter describes unexpected twists in the 
identity development of this student, twists that emerged across several months in a ninth 
grade classroom.  It shows how she develops from being a typical student to being an 
outcast in the classroom, as the teachers and other students come consistently to position 
her this way. 
 
1.  Beyond Macro and Micro in Social Identification 
 
Once we leave the boundaries of the speech event as the focus of analysis, we seem to 
have opened Pandora’s Box.  Many have warned against units of analysis that go beyond 
what we can observe empirically in a speech event and its immediate context (Garfinkel, 
1967; Rampton, 1999; Schegloff, 1998).  Macrosociological accounts that use analysts’ 
categories to obliterate participants’ realities are a real danger.  In order to see how 
analysts can go beyond the speech event in an empirically warranted and theoretically 
coherent way, we must briefly examine contemporary “macro,” “micro” and “practice” 
accounts of social identification. 
 
Individuals behave in certain ways or manifest certain characteristics, and those 
behaviors or characteristics are interpreted by the individual and by others as signs of 
identity, as indicating that the individual belongs to some recognized social type.  Even 
though countless events of social identification happen unproblematically in everyday life, 
however, it is not easy to explain how this process occurs.  Any sign of identity can be 
interpreted in more than one way, and the behavior of any individual contains many 
potential signs of identity which might support conflicting identifications of that individual.  
This creates indeterminacy in social identification: participants and observers might attend 
to different signs, or interpret the same signs differently, such that the focal individual 
would be identified differently.  Given this indeterminacy, how do individuals get 
routinely identified in practice?   
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This indeterminate relation between signs and categories of identity is never 
overcome in principle—despite various proposals about how a “grammar” of mental 
intentions or rigid rules of language use determine what a sign of identity means (e.g., 
Searle, 1969).  In practice, as more signs of identity emerge and index relevant context, the 
signs do tend to presuppose converging things about individuals’ identities.  A sign of 
identity generally comes to have a clear meaning over time, as subsequent signs 
recontextualize it in a configuration of signs, relevant context and presupposed categories 
of identity that solidifies over an interaction (Silverstein, 1992; Wortham, 2001a).   
 
This process of social identification happens only in actual events, and signs of 
identity can be interpreted only with respect to particular contexts of use.  But a sign 
cannot contribute to social identification if it does not index a more widely circulating 
model that includes categories for types of people and types of events.  Holland and her 
colleagues (Holland, Lachicotte, Skinner & Cain, 1998) refer to these models as “figured 
worlds,” culturally shared, often idealized types of events that involve recognizable sorts 
of people engaged in characteristic sorts of actions.   
 
The most common account of social identification proposes a “dialectic” between 
macro-level models and categories of identity and micro-level events of identification.  
“Dialectic” here is not used in the more complex Hegelian sense, but simply to mean the 
mutual constitution or moving back and forth between two poles.  On such an account, 
more widely circulating categories of identity constrain acts of identification, but 
particular acts either reinforce or help to transform the macro-level categories.  This 
position is often credited to Giddens (1976), who called it “structuration,” but many others 
have adopted a similar position (cf., e.g., Linger, 2001).   
 
This “macro-micro dialectic” account of social identification captures some essential 
aspects of the process.   Identification cannot occur unless people presuppose more widely 
circulating categories and models of identity, but these models only exist in particular 
events, in which they are always recontextualized and often inflected in specific ways.  
Despite its apparent plausibility, however, many have recently criticized the macro-micro 
dialectic model (e.g., Bourdieu, 1972/1977; Holland & Lave, 2001; Urban, 2001).  At its 
worst, the model presupposes macro-level properties of groups or institutions, without 
explaining how these are created and maintained—except with the vague claim that they 
are “constituted” in actual events, a claim which means simply that macro-level categories 
repeatedly appear in actual events.  But a deterministic macro-level account would agree 
with this claim too.  Theories of the macro-micro dialectic risk masking macro-level 
determinism with vague assertions about practice and agency. 
 
Many have recently sought to avoid these shortcomings, while preserving the 
strengths of macro-micro accounts, by studying “practice.”  Dorothy Holland and Jean 
Lave (Holland & Lave, 2001; Lave & Wenger, 1991) have begun to do this with their 
concepts of “community of practice” and “history in person.”  Instead of describing 
individuals and events as already formed and “affected by” or “creating” social categories 
and institutions, they study the constitution of selves, events and institutions in practice.  
Practices are sociohistorically produced, but they are not just derived from macro-level 
categories.  Holland and Lave redescribe macro-level categories and institutions in terms 
of “enduring struggles,” to emphasize how they are contested and constituted in practice.  
Particular events and actions can intervene in and transform these struggles, but such acts 
and events are always mediated by sociocultural forms that pre-exist particular events.  
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Practice theory promises a more specific account of how micro and macro interrelate.  
By examining the third realm of practice, analysts can explore how categories of identity 
and events of identification are jointly produced in context.  This approach only works if 
“practice” gets specified, however.  One sometimes hears the word invoked, as if its 
proponents have identified the fundamental level at which social life operates—even 
though the word gets used to describe widely differing levels, from types of human 
activities that recur over decades (e.g., Taylor, 1985), to particular sets of events involving 
similar people that take place over months (e.g., Gregory, 2001), to particular events that 
take place over a few minutes (e.g., Rampton, 1999).  If “practice” is to be where various 
components come together to produce social identities, so that we can analyze how the 
process actually works, we must know more specifically what it looks like. 
 
Cole (1996) and Lemke (2000) provide a useful concept here: “timescales.”  A 
timescale is the spatiotemporal envelope within which a process happens.  The emergence 
of capitalism, a process which in some respects has taken millennia, and in other respects 
centuries (cf. Postone, 1993), occurs at a very long timescale.  In contrast, individuals 
develop their capacities and live their lives at an ontogenetic timescale, across decades.  
Particular groups develop relationships and local habits, like those that emerge within a 
classroom, at a “meso-level” timescale that covers the weeks, months or years that a group 
interacts together.  And particular events take place at shorter timescales, taking minutes 
or hours.  “Macro,” “micro” and “practice,” then, abstract away from a diverse continuum 
of timescales. 
 
“Practice” cannot be one particular, privileged timescale.  “In practice” does not mean 
only events that happen across months but not decades, for example, or across months but 
not days.  One could posit an indefinite number of intervening timescales, from the life of 
the universe to nanoseconds, and it would be empirically false to claim that some 
timescale, or some particular combination, was naturally basic to human activity (Lemke, 
2000).  If “practice” is to help us specify how various relevant components (“macro,” 
“micro,” “meso” and other) constitute a process like social identification, it must be 
understood more generically, as something like: the set of processes, drawing on 
components from various timescales that are relevant to constituting a focal phenomenon. 
 
The timescales relevant to explaining a social phenomenon cannot be determined in 
advance, but depend on the particular phenomenon being explained.  In order to explain 
the development and spread of Received Pronunciation in Britain, for instance, Agha 
(2003) shows that the relevant processes took place over a couple of centuries, with crucial 
developments (e.g., involving the increased circulation of popular novels containing 
extensive quoted speech) at the timescale of years and decades.  Although some processes 
at both longer and shorter timescales played some role, Agha shows that the key processes 
in this case involve centuries, decades, and particular events of writing, reading and 
interactionally circulating the relevant metapragmatic models.  In this chapter I argue that, 
in order to explain the emergence of identities in a classroom, we must attend to a 
somewhat different set of timescales.  We must attend particularly to the locally emerging 
models and categories of identity in the classroom over the year, as these interrelate with 
more widely circulating conceptions of gender, race and schooling.  And we must attend 
to how these widely and locally circulating models occur in two particular kinds of 
events—explicit metapragmatic labeling of students and “participant examples” (Wortham, 
1994) that include these students as characters in the example.  These two cases, of 
Received Pronunciation and classroom identity development, illustrate how the relevant 
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timescales for explaining any social phenomenon depend on the particulars of the case.  
We cannot develop a general social theory that specifies the primordial timescales from 
which all phenomena can be explained, because different phenomena will best be 
explained using different configurations of timescales. 
 
The analyses below illustrate how one student gets identified contrary to some 
important macro and meso-level models of gender in a classroom, and how she struggles 
with and against her emerging identity.  The analyses show how meso-level processes, like 
the development of categories within a particular classroom over several months, play an 
essential role in constituting the social identification of a student.  I do not claim that the 
particular timescales that I cite in this case are always the right ones for studying social 
identification.  The relevant processes and timescales will vary depending on the focal 
phenomenon being analyzed.  Nor do I claim to have analyzed all timescales relevant to 
the social identification of this student in this classroom—to do so would require much 
more space.  But I do claim to show that adequate analysis of social identification in this 
case must attend to how processes at various timescales interconnect.  I emphasize the 
meso-level processes of teachers’ and students’ months-long development of categories 
and identities, in order to highlight how micro and macro by themselves will not suffice as 
analytic tools. 
 
2. Methods and Ethnographic Background 
 
Colleoni High is a large three-story brick building that occupies an entire city block.  
When it was built about 50 years ago, Colleoni enrolled primarily Catholic children from 
Irish and Italian backgrounds.  The neighborhood has become predominantly African 
American, together with growing populations of Latino and South Asian immigrants.  In 
the early 1990s, when I was there, the student body was ethnically mixed and mostly 
working and lower class.  50% of the students were black, 25% were Latino, 15% were 
white, and 10% were Asian.  The faculty contained many whites, some blacks, and a few 
Latinos. 
 
I spent 128 hours at Colleoni over two years, more than 100 of them in classes.  
Three-quarters of those classroom hours came in the final year, when I audiotaped most 
classes that I observed.  Throughout my time at Colleoni I took fieldnotes, I had many 
informal conversations with teachers after classes, and I conducted interviews with 
teachers, administrators, and students.  I spent about 50 hours in one particular class across 
the final year.  Fifteen of the 19 students in this ninth grade class were black, and 14 were 
female.   
 
Like many other schools in the city, Colleoni participated voluntarily in desegregation 
by offering a special educational program to students throughout the district.  At Colleoni, 
the program was based on guidelines from The Paideia Proposal (Adler, 1982).  Parents 
and educators considered this program to be academically superior to most neighborhood 
schools, but not on par with the prestigious magnet programs.  About one quarter of the 
students at Colleoni participated in this special program.  Most of these students did not 
live in the neighborhood, and some commuted substantial distances.  Following Adler’s 
advice, the teachers at Colleoni tried to engage student with “genuine questions.”  They 
encouraged “seminar” discussions in which students presented and defended positions on 
complex questions, instead of simply parroting back the teacher’s preferred answers.  The 
two ninth grade teachers that I observed in the final year, Mrs. Bailey and Mr. Smith, ran 
Social Identification Beyond the Speech Event 36 
joint history/English classes twice a week, when they had 80-minute seminar discussions 
with the nineteen students.  The other three days a week each teacher ran more 
conventional didactic lessons for 40 minutes each.  Increasingly over the year, they 
engaged students in rich discussions of complex texts—discussions in which students 
came to recognize issues of enduring human concern and to formulate their own 
arguments about these issues. 
 
I made contact with Colleoni through the administrator who ran the special program.  
I told him I was interested in observing the program itself, as well as classroom language 
use.  He selected certain teachers for me to talk to.  I spoke with these teachers, received 
permission from them, and then began visiting their classrooms.  I introduced myself to 
teachers as someone who had read a lot about classrooms in books, but who did not know 
much about them in practice.  I tried to minimize any authority I brought with me from the 
university, by presenting myself as a novice who wanted to learn how teaching and 
learning actually happen.  Nonetheless, teachers were initially uncomfortable with me in 
their classrooms.  I received many sidelong glances, as well as indirect requests for 
information on what I was doing and what I thought of them.  Like the teachers, at first the 
students wondered who I was and what I was doing.  After a few weeks, however, teachers 
and students came to ignore me during class.  They clearly knew I was there, especially 
when I began recording classes.  After a particularly bad joke someone would occasionally 
comment “and that was recorded for posterity.”  But after the first few weeks of recording, 
I noticed few differences between the classes I had observed without recording equipment 
and those I taped.   
 
The analyses for this chapter involved two types of speech events:  explicit 
metapragmatic descriptions of the focal student and “participant examples,” in which this 
student herself becomes a character in examples used to discuss the subject matter 
(Wortham, 1994).  In analyzing the tapes and fieldnotes from Mr. Smith and Mrs. Bailey's 
class, I focused on such examples.  I transcribed all examples that included the focal 
student and analyzed them for any implications they might have for students' social 
identities. The methods of discourse analysis, which identify types of cues that often serve 
as signs of identity, are described in Wortham (2001a).  In addition, I have gone through 
all tapes and notes, looking for explicit statements about, and implicit positioning relevant 
to, the focal student’s identity. The data analyses in the next section present representative 
instances from across the year in which the focal student (“Tyisha”) gets socially 
identified, plus one extended participant example that contributed to her emerging social 
identity in the classroom.  
 
3. Tyisha the Disruptive Student 
 
Almost from the beginning of the year in Mrs. Bailey and Mr. Smith’s class, teachers 
and most students presupposed that girls and boys have different social identities with 
respect to school.  As Mrs. Bailey said explicitly one day in November, girls are easier for 
teachers to deal with, because they conform to school expectations, and thus they are more 
likely to succeed in school and in adulthood.  Boys are more difficult to deal with, because 
they resist school expectations, and they are less likely to succeed both in school and in 
later life.  This expectation about identity draws on circulating sociohistorical patterns, 
like those that identify adolescent boys as disdainful of school success (Newkirk, 2002) 
and those that identify black male students as particularly concerned with respect and  
more likely to resist participation in school (Anderson 1999; Ferguson 2000).  But the 
gender difference was especially salient in this classroom, for two reasons.  First, Mrs. 
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Bailey believed what she said—she both explicitly and implicitly stated it throughout the 
year, and the girls took many opportunities to remind the boys about these presupposed 
gender differences.  Second, from early in the year the boys all tried to sit together in the 
back of the room, and all but one of them generally refused to participate, while many 
girls participated actively and dominated classroom discussions. 
 
3.1.  From Normative Girl to Disruptive Student 
 
At the beginning of the year, Tyisha fit this gender stereotype: she was an active, 
successful female student.  She was very engaged, offering her opinions on many subjects 
related to class discussion.  Most of the students started the year trying to figure out and 
parrot back what the teachers wanted them to say.  Because Tyisha rarely did this, but 
instead offered her own opinions, the teachers initially identified her as a student who 
made her own arguments.  In a Paideia seminar this is desirable, so they identified Tyisha 
as a good student.   
 
The following segment comes from a class on October 9.  (“T/B” stands for Mrs. 
Bailey; “FST” stands for an unidentified female student; “TYI” stands for Tyisha; other 
abbreviations in subsequent transcripts stand for the pseudonyms of other students; 
transcription conventions are in the appendix). 
 
T/B:  okay, we've got women having ba:bies. how does that  
relate to having women goddesses? 
40 TYI:  it doesn't, to me. 
T/B:  it doesn't to you. how about you? 
FST:  maybe they think that that's supernatural. 
T/B:  that that's supernatural? having a baby is supernatural. 
 
At line 40 Tyisha fails to give an answer the teacher is looking for.  She also emphasizes 
her opinion, by adding the phrase “to me.”  But Mrs. Bailey does not evaluate Tyisha 
negatively.  In fact, the teacher repeats Tyisha’s utterance and goes on to ask for another 
student’s opinion.  Mrs. Bailey often asks several students in turn for their opinions on 
issues raised in the text, and here we see how Tyisha’s habitual personalization of her 
opinions fits with the teacher’s expectations.  Especially early in the year, the teachers 
reacted positively to Tyisha when she offered her own opinions, because they wanted 
other students to do the same. 
 
Later on in the October 9 class, Tyisha says something deliberately off-topic, 
apparently as a joke.  In the following segment they are discussing bees, in order to 
understand a Chinese myth that compares humans to insects. 
 
T/B:  bees do what? 
TYI:  kill. 
290 [laughter] 
MRC:  some bee pollen, they raise[ pollen 
T/B:                                                 [ they fertilize= 
FST:  flowers.  
T/B:  what do spiders do? they fertilize plants. bees are  
295  people who, are insects who ahh, Cassandra? 
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At line 290, several students treat Tyisha’s comment as a joke, by laughing.  It was a small 
joke, but apparently successful.  Note that the teachers do not discipline Tyisha for this.  
Mrs. Bailey simply ignores Tyisha’s comment and continues with the discussion.  Tyisha 
then reenters the conversation more constructively. 
 
T/B:  how long do insects live? 
CAN:   maybe ten days, about[ a week 
MRC:                                      [ a week. 
T/B:  a day, a couple of months, alright. 
320 TYI:  some of them a day because you know, if they bite  
you, they die. 
T/B:  okay some of them as soon- as soon as they, they, they  
put their stinger in it, they're dead. okay, now put that back  
to Pampu. why might the Chinese believe or feel that ma:n  
325 comes from the earth as an insect. that ma:n is similar to 
 an insect? 
 
At lines 322-3, Mrs. Bailey restates and thus ratifies Tyisha’s comment as a useful 
contribution, one which allows Mrs. Bailey to go on to her analogy between the mortality 
of bees and the idea of humans as like insects (at lines 323-326). 
 
At the beginning of the year, then, the teachers treated Tyisha as a normal student.  
They appreciated her opinions and they did not discipline her when she made jokes.  After 
a month or two, however, several other students learned to offer arguments and give 
evidence as the teachers wanted.  At this point, the teachers increasingly distinguished 
between Tyisha’s comments—which they began to characterize as “opinions” offered 
without supporting evidence—and more successful students who gave better arguments.  
Tyisha’s behavior had not changed much.  But relative to the teachers’ expectations and to 
other students’ increasingly successful participation, it looked as if Tyisha was acting 
differently.  In December and January, her social identity began to shift from being a good 
student to being a disruptive one.  Both teachers and other students began to treat her this 
way. 
 
Evidence for this comes from the teachers’ increasingly blunt evaluations of Tyisha.  
Right before the following segment (from January 18), Mrs. Bailey had just given an 
interpretation of Aristotle’s text.  Aristotle is not saying that women are slaves to men, 
only that the relationship between a man and woman is partly analogous to the relationship 
between a master and a slave. 
 
TYI:  okay, when- um Sylvia was talking about the slave 
and the ma:ster, the master, okay, the slave, he uses  
430 his hands and stuff but- they won't give him a chance to use 
his- to teach him to read and stuff and the master know 
how, so he using his mind.  why does he [ [4 unintelligible  
syllables] 
T/B:     [ okay, didn’t- you  
435 just missed the connection, the con- the thing is that-  
do not look at this as saying that slaves are manual workers,  
slaves- women are slaves. look at these as four distinct
relationships.  
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Tyisha’s reasoning may be wandering a bit from lines 428-433, but she is apparently 
struggling with issues relevant to the text.  Nonetheless, Mrs. Bailey interrupts to tell her 
that “you just missed the connection” (lines 434-435). 
 
This incident alone might have been momentary impatience on the teacher’s part, but 
the following evaluation follows immediately.   
 
T/B:  and in Greeks- in Greece, there certainly were  
slaves that used their mind. yeah? 
445 FST:  I’m talking about going back to what Tyisha said  
about how slaves that- well- if, okay if a master didn't teach  
the slaves how to read, how did they learn how to read?  
how did we know how to read and talk ourselves?  
T/B:  o[kay, you just missed-  
450 TYI:   [ right, thank you. 
T/B:  you just missed the point. 
JAS:  you missed the point. we're not compari[ng them. 
TYI:                                          [I know,  
but I'm talking about- 
455 T/B:  okay, look at this again, mental, manual workers,  
are mental workers 
 
At line 445 a student refers back to the earlier comment by Tyisha, building on Tyisha’s 
comment to ask a question.  Normally, these teachers encouraged students to refer to each 
other’s comments, as a way of developing more complex arguments across the group.  
And at line 450 Tyisha explicitly thanks the other student for referencing her point and 
asking the question. 
 
But Mrs. Bailey immediately jumps in (at line 449) and returns to her earlier 
evaluation of Tyisha’s point, with similar phrasing: “you just missed the point.”  The 
speed of Mrs. Bailey’s intervention, and her blunt characterization of Tyisha’s (and the 
second student’s) point, is uncharacteristic for this class.  These teachers want students to 
develop their own arguments, and they generally help students who are struggling to 
articulate something.  But by January they have started to presuppose that Tyisha’s points 
will not contribute to the conversation—that her comments are disruptive and not 
substantive.  Note that another student (Jasmine) echoes Mrs. Bailey’s evaluation of 
Tyisha, at line 452.  Other students, too, have come to presuppose that Tyisha is disruptive.  
Jasmine also uses “we” in line 452, probably to distinguish Tyisha and her one defender 
from the teachers and the other students. 
 
This split between Tyisha and the rest of the girls broadened over time, as Tyisha was 
increasingly identified as a disruptive student.  The teachers continued to react quickly and 
harshly to many of her comments, presupposing that her contributions were intellectually 
unproductive and disruptive.  The following segment, for instance, comes from January 25. 
 
T/B:  okay. well I think that he's talking more not  
about not being with people, but that he: will not  
have to have people bail him out at any point. he  
1055 can make it on his own.   
TYI:  so you gonna be the only person living  
there? 
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T/B:  no. that's not what he's saying, Tyisha. 
CAN:  he's saying that he can live without people  
1060 helping him.  
 
At lines 1052-1055, Mrs. Bailey is summarizing her interpretation of a point.  Tyisha 
offers a gloss at lines 1056-1057, a gloss which misstates Mrs. Bailey’s point, and the 
teacher reacts immediately by telling Tyisha she’s wrong.  This quick and blunt response 
contrasts with the teachers’ habitual reaction to other students, and to Tyisha earlier in the 
year, when they would have explored her point or been more gentle in evaluating her 
response—as they were on October 9 when reacting to her joke about the bees.  Another 
student gives a more accurate gloss at lines 1059-1060 and the class goes on discussing the 
point, ignoring Tyisha. 
 
By February, Tyisha’s identity as a disruptive outcast had solidified.  It was then 
generally presupposable that she was disorganized, prone to offer comments that took the 
class off-topic, and concerned with her own ideas more than with helping the group 
develop a coherent discussion.  Thus Tyisha became an exception to the gender stereotype 
that teachers and students continued to presuppose.  She was a girl who nonetheless was 
not a good student and was not likely to succeed. 
 
By early February, Mr. Smith (“T/S”) was characterizing Tyisha explicitly as a bad 
student who does not listen.  The following segment comes from February 11. 
 
50 T/S:  I will do a spot check, spot check your notebook.   
the notebook, and you better listen Tyisha, because you  
have a habit of never listening to me.  °Tyisha° 
TYI:  I know what you’re talking about[ 
T/S:                                                         [no.   
55 TYI:  you’re talking about[ the notebook 
T/S:                                    [°your ears are unfortunately  
closed sometimes.° 
… 
T/S:  number five. who made the laws? 
65 FST:  the assembly. 
T/S:  okay[ what page?   
TYI:         [°the king° 
T/S:  no. you’re wrong. because you’re guessing without  
looking. and that is=[  
70 TYI:              [no way. 
T/S:  =exactly what you do as a bad[ student.   
TYI:                        [no I wasn’t 
T/S:  halt. 
 
At line 52, Mr. Smith says that Tyisha never listens to him.  And at line 71 he calls her a 
bad student.  Mr. Smith had a temper, and he sometimes made inappropriate comments 
like this about other students.  But Tyisha was much more likely to be the target, because 
teachers and students had presupposed that she was a disruptive student. 
 
My data contain at least a dozen other telling examples, from December through May, 
of how Tyisha was explicitly identified as disruptive by the teachers and students.  They 
accused her of not listening, of being wrong, and of making comments that led discussion 
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off-track.  These comments collectively show that the teachers and students had begun to 
identify her differently than they did earlier in the year.  From September through 
November she was just another student, but by December and January she had become a 
disruptive student.  As such, they often assumed that her comments were incorrect or off-
topic.  Instead of taking time to explore the reasoning behind her comments—and, it must 
be said, there was only sometimes defensible reasoning discernible behind them—the 
teachers and other students quickly dismissed Tyisha and moved back to their own 
discussion. 
 
In addition to these explicit metapragmatic characterizations of Tyisha, I have also 
identified eight segments from classroom discussions (lasting on average more than half 
an hour), from November through February, in which Tyisha plays a major role.  She 
herself becomes an example in each of these cases, an example that gets discussed as 
analogous to the text and as analogous to the curricular issue on the table.  Tyisha becomes 
the favored example when a text includes an outcast—someone who acts for his or her 
own good without considering the good of the society.  As teachers and students discuss 
more of these examples, Tyisha’s identity as an outcast in the classroom becomes more 
and more heavily presupposed.  Tyisha’s identity certainly gets presupposed and 
reinforced in other classroom events, but I argue that these eight classroom discussions 
carry particular force because of the extended focus on her as a topic and because of the 
power that such participant examples can have (cf. Wortham 1994, 2001b). 
 
All of these eight cases—which I argue play an important role in Tyisha’s identity 
development—are participant examples (Wortham 1994, 2001b).  Participant examples 
include, as a character in the example, at least one teacher or student who is participating 
in the classroom discussion.  Such examples double the roles played by those teachers or 
students, because they become characters in the example as well as participants in the 
classroom discussion.  This doubling of roles makes participant examples rich sites for 
socially salient interactional positioning.  Discussion of participants' hypothetical identities 
within the example can communicate things about the actual participants, as a sort of 
double entendre.   
 
Furthermore, it turns out that the content represented by a participant example and the 
interactional patterns enacted through that example can sometimes run parallel (Wortham 
1994, 1997).  That is, in discussing certain events as the content of an example, teachers 
and students sometimes enact analogous events in their classroom interaction.  Examples 
involving such a parallel between representation and enactment are particularly likely to 
contribute both to social identification and to academic learning (Wortham 2001b).  The 
following section analyzes a participant example that involved Tyisha, in order to illustrate 
how this type of classroom discussion facilitates her social identification in the classroom. 
 
3.2.  Tyisha the “courageous liar”  
 
Tyisha did not become a disruptive student solely through the teachers’ intervention.  
Tyisha herself often embraced an oppositional identity.  Sometimes she did this in ways 
that the teachers themselves identified as productive, when she challenged arguments 
made by the teachers and authors of the texts.  Sometimes, however, her penchant for 
defending unpopular positions took her too far, and she wasted class time while refusing to 
admit a mistake.  She also made arguments and interrupted the teachers in apparently 
deliberate attempts to antagonize them. 
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The following example illustrates these behaviors.  This discussion occurred on 
January 18, while the the two teachers and the students were exploring Aristotle’s 
definition of courage as articulated in his Politics.  Specifically, at this point in the 
discussion, Mrs. Bailey had asked whether a person could courageously obey as well as 
courageously resist.  She suggested that one could obey courageously, and she gave brief 
examples like overcoming anxiety to give a presentation in class.  Tyisha then volunteered 
her own participant example, supposedly to support Mrs. Bailey’s point, saying “Mrs. 
Bailey, I think I have one.” 
 
As it turns out, however, Tyisha’s example does not illustrate Mrs. Bailey’s point and 
it leads the class off track.  Given that Tyisha laughs while giving the example, and that 
she defends her example with increasingly outrageous claims, it may well be that she 
intended to make a joke and take the class off topic.  She did similar things at other times 
during the year.  This example illustrates how Tyisha interactionally positions herself, and 
gets positioned, as a disruptive and marginal member of the class.  Tyisha introduces her 
example as follows. 
 
TYI:  okay, I(hhh)- I had a friend. and she was like,  
sneaking out with a boy, and she lied and said that she was  
going with her friends. (hh) a(h)nd she told me, if my  
270 mother call, to tell her she was at the zoo with her friend  
Stacey. now that took her courage to te(h)ll me.   
FST:  (hhh) 
TYI:   and it took c(hh)oura(h)ge for me to tell her  
mother that. 
275 FST:  ˚mhm˚ 
T/B:  did it take courage for[ her to tell her mother tha[t? 
FST:            [ no           [I  
don't think so  
T/B:  why would th[at  
280 TYI:                        [ yeah it took courage to tell my  
mother 
FST:  [3 unintelligible syllables] 
MRC:  I don’t think it took courage.  
 
Tyisha gives her example at lines 267-271, and then at lines 273-274 she claims that it 
took courage for her to lie to her friend’s mother.  Since they are discussing Aristotle’s 
definition of courage, this might be a relevant example to explore—even though it does 
not illustrate the concept of “courage through obedience” that Mrs. Bailey had asked for. 
 
But the example presents interactional problems for the teachers, as Tyisha probably 
intended.  Because the example involves immoral behavior (at least from an adult’s point 
of view), if Tyisha’s behavior was in fact courageous then the teachers would have to 
acknowledge her courage while condemning her behavior.  We might speculate that 
Tyisha is using this discussion of subject matter to put the teachers in an awkward position, 
or at least to slip illicit topics into an academic discussion in such a way that she cannot be 
sanctioned for it.  She is both adopting and reveling in an oppositional identity, as an 
adolescent who helps her friend get away with illicit dates and who can also manage to 
talk about this in an academic discussion—perhaps even in such a way that her 
oppositional behavior gets classified as courageous.  Thus she gives an example of herself 
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being oppositional in relation to her friend’s mother, and she herself acts oppositional in 
class by giving this as an example. 
 
By laughing several times while she gives her example, Tyisha (at lines 267, 269, 271 
and 273) and another student (at line 272) seem to support this interpretation of her 
example as partly a joke, or as an attempt to trap the teachers between illicit topics and 
academic content.  At line 276, Mrs. Bailey implies that Tyisha’s behavior was not 
courageous, and a student agrees with her at lines 277-278.  Tyisha interrupts Mrs. 
Bailey’s next comment, to restate that it did in fact take courage on her part.  Another 
student (Maurice, or “MRC”) then sides with the teacher at line 283, denying that Tyisha’s 
lie took courage.  So Mrs. Bailey’s initial reaction to Tyisha’s challenge is to deny that 
Tyisha was courageous. 
 
Mr. Smith, however, gives Tyisha another opportunity to make her case in the next 
segment.  He interrupts Mrs. Bailey’s attempt to change the topic, saying (at lines 287-
288) “let her finish…”.  Then he asks: 
 
295 T/S:  then, which is courage?  
T/B:  shhh 
FST:  [so you gonna sit there and lie to[her face 
T/S:   [lying                                       [to lie: or to tell the  
truth be[cause you= 
300 FST:   [˚to tell the truth˚ 
T/S: = knew that she was wrong. 
CAN: ˚cause its wrong˚ 
FST:  tell the truth. tell the truth
TYI:  both of them=  
305 JAS: =both of them take courage [ to me 
TYI:                     [=both of them take  
cou [rage, you all wrong 
T/S:[ explai:n how both .  
 
Mr. Smith calls for Tyisha to elaborate her example, perhaps hoping that she will provide 
something more for them to work with in interpreting Aristotle’s account of courage.  He 
also explicitly describes Tyisha as “lying,” for the first time.  When Tyisha gave the 
example, she used the metapragmatic verb “tell” to describe her own act of speaking (lines 
270, 273), although she said her friend was “sneaking out” and “lied” to her mother (lines 
268). 
 
In a segment not shown here Tyisha then elaborates her example, somewhat unclearly, 
and several students speak over each other.  In Mr. Smith’s response, however, it becomes 
clear that he was not really siding with Tyisha.  At lines 295 and 298-299, Mr. Smith asks 
whether it was really courageous to lie, or whether it would in fact have been more 
courageous to tell her friend’s mother the truth.  At lines 300, 302 and 303, other students 
side with Mr. Smith, claiming that lying is wrong and that telling the truth would have 
been more courageous.  But at line 304 Tyisha claims that both lying and telling the truth 
could have been courageous, and at line 305 Jasmine agrees with her.  Tyisha ends with a 
characteristic utterance at line 307—“you all wrong.”  Note how she is separating herself 
off from the rest of the class and defending an unpopular position.  This separation is not 
only enacted in her argument against the teachers and other students in the classroom, but 
also presupposed in the content of the example.  By describing herself as someone who 
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breaks moral rules, which the teachers and many of the students adhere to, Tyisha also 
marginalizes herself from other members of the group. 
 
Mr. Smith then asks Tyisha to explain how both lying and telling the truth could be 
courageous.  So she continues. 
TYI:  because (hhhh[h) 
310 FST:                         [ because 
T/S:  let her 
TYI:  if I lyin’- If I'm sittin’ here lying in another person  
mother face, that took courag(h)e. [ and if I'm= 
T/S:                                                [ why? 
315 TYI: =telling her because you don't- 
FST:  lies. 
T/S:  have you never lied to your mother? 
FST: ˚hnuh˚ 
TYI:  no- not- not to no one else’s momma, no. 
320 T/S:  have you ever lied to a teacher who is a mother? 
FST:  uh(hhh) 
TYI:  that's different. 
FST:  aw man. 
STS:  [2 seconds of laughter] 
325 TYI:  that’s very different um- I mean that's different. I'm  
always over there visiting this friend and her mother, might  
have had trus- trust in me and I come over and tell her this  
big, bo:ld faced lie. 
 
From lines 309-315, Tyisha reiterates her claim that lying to her friend’s mother took 
courage.  Mr. Smith then takes control of the conversation, asking her questions at lines 
314, 317, and 320, although his questions still do not make clear how this example 
illuminates Aristotle’s definition of courage. 
 
Mr. Smith’s question at line 320 brings the example closer to students’ and teachers’ 
real identities in the classroom, when he asks whether Tyisha has “ever lied to a teacher 
who is a mother.”  Everyone knows that Mrs. Bailey is a mother—in fact, the mother of a 
teenage girl.  So Mr. Smith’s question highlights the interactional tension that Tyisha’s 
example raises.  Tyisha is proud of the fact that she lied to her friend’s mother, even 
though Mrs. Bailey and other adults would clearly identify with the friend’s mother and 
consider this wrong.  Tyisha thus opposes herself to Mrs. Bailey and people like her. 
 
Tyisha revels in this oppositional identity, as illustrated in the sequence of 
increasingly colorful metapragmatic terms that she uses to describe her lie.  As noted 
above, she started by using the verb “tell” to describe what she said to her friend’s mother 
(at line 270).  Mr. Smith reframed this as a “lie” at line 288, and opposed such lying to 
“telling the truth” (line 298).  Another student spiced this up a bit: “so you gonna sit there 
and lie to her face” (line 297).  Tyisha herself embraced this characterization of her act at 
lines 312-313: “I’m sitting here lying in another person mother face.”  And she ends up 
with: “her mother might have had trust in me and I come over and tell her this big bold-
faced lie” (lines 326-328).  Far from euphemizing what she did, Tyisha ends up embracing 
the non-normative character of her action and proudly flaunting social norms.  This clearly 
opposes her to Mrs. Bailey, who might well be worrying about her own daughter’s friends 
doing the same thing to her. 
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In addition to embracing an oppositional identity here, Tyisha has also embedded this 
assertion of oppositional identity within an academic discussion about Aristotle’s concept 
of courage.  This hijacking of the discussion itself constitutes an oppositional act.  Mr. 
Smith nonetheless continues to pursue the discussion as if it had academic merit.  Perhaps 
he thinks that he can win the argument about whether Tyisha was in fact courageous.  Or 
perhaps he recognizes that her argument does have some merit (it is at least arguable that 
one can sin courageously).  If Tyisha’s purpose is to hijack the discussion, however, his 
pursuing the example furthers her agenda. 
 
T/S:  did you feel courage or did you feel guilt? 
330 TYI:  I felt both of them ˚ [2 unintelligible syllables] ˚ 
T/S:  courage to be guilty? [quizzical intonation contour,  
mid-low-mid] 
TYI:  (hhh) nah, but it took courage to do[ that. 
JAS:                      [ it do take  
335 courage to be guilty. 
FST:  [1 second of laughter] 
TYI:  I know. like we goin’ to [ steal something.  it took= 
T/S:             [ you should be guilty 
TYI:  =courage for me to go sneakin out of the store, right? 
340 FST:  hahaha 
T/S:  courage to be guilty. 
JAS:  you thief. 
STS:  [1 second of laughter] 
JAS:  cause- and you- okay, you go in the store. and you steal  
345 something, I mean [ that take courage = 
TYI:                   [it took courage to do it 
JAS: =to steal something, and then you gonna be guilty  
afterward, right?  right? 
TYI:  s- say it. go ahead.   
350 STS:  [2 seconds of laughter] 
 
At line 329, Mr. Smith returns to the question of whether Tyisha felt courage or guilt 
while lying.  Tyisha claims she felt both at line 330.  Mr. Smith then seems to be making 
fun of her argument with a “quizzical” intonation contour.  Students laugh a bit after his 
remark.  After Tyisha reiterates that her lie was courageous at line 333, Jasmine apparently 
makes fun of Tyisha at lines 334-335, saying “it do take courage to be guilty.”  Students 
laugh at the joke. 
 
It is ambiguous here, however, whether the other students are laughing at Tyisha or 
with Tyisha.  If my reading has been correct, Tyisha has all along intended for her 
example to be at least partly a joke.  So it may be that she has succeeded at getting other 
students to laugh.  Jasmine’s comment at lines 334-335, however, seems to follow up on 
Mr. Smith’s quizzical comment and to make fun of Tyisha.  Tyisha responds with a 
second example, one involving more serious transgressions than the first, at lines 337-339.  
She may be trying to build on the success of her first example, which managed both to 
make a joke and to condone oppositional behavior.  But Mr. Smith’s echoes Jasmine’s 
tease at line 341, and then Jasmine herself laughingly calls Tyisha a thief.   
 
Social Identification Beyond the Speech Event 46 
It appears for a moment as if everyone is laughing at Tyisha, but then Jasmine sides 
with her in the argument against Mr. Smith.  At lines 344-348, Jasmine agrees with Tyisha 
(and her own earlier comment) that moral transgressions like stealing take courage.  
Tyisha echoes this at line 346.  It is relevant here that Jasmine is the most verbally skilled 
of the students.  She won the school-wide student talent competition that year, and she 
regularly had the class rolling with laughter.  Her comments here contribute to the 
academic argument but are also very funny. 
 
At this point, in several lines not included here, a student objects that stealing is 
wrong, while Tyisha and Jasmine defend their claim that stealing can be both courageous 
and guilt-inducing.  Then another student claims that stealing is wrong and brings the 
discussion back to the concept of courage. 
 
LIN:  I don't think that's courage to go and steal a candy bar  
385      [ because courage-  right= 
MST:  [ it’s stupid 
LIN:  =cause courage, the virtue of courage, what we read  
of courage was to do something- something goo:d, not to  
do something and go and do something [evil. 
390 TYI:                 [that’s not  
true 
FST:                 [yeah that’s  
right 
TYI:  courage is not just doing something goo:d. 
395 [students talking at once] 
TYI:  if I go[ shoot you in the head  
T/B:            [ shhhhhh 
[students arguing]     
T/B:  ahh, if we can- if we can talk about courage as being  
400 something good, the virtue of courage, and go back to that  
definition, and I know you never bought into it, but the rest  
of us seem to be, using this as a definition, so therefore,  
we'd ask you to kind of go along with it. 
FST:  okay. 
405 T/B:  the idea of courage, was not just doing things you're  
afraid to do, but doing things that- overcoming your fear  
for a good reason. Linda? 
LIN:  I was saying what Tyisha said, if you go shoot  
somebody in the head, you gonna call that courage? or you  
410 is gonna call that stupid? 
 
While Linda disagrees with Tyisha and Jasmine’s claim that stealing requires courage (at 
line 384), one of the male students (“MST,” an unidentified male student) slips in a 
characterization of stealing: “it’s stupid” (line 386).  One might infer that people like 
Tyisha who defend such behavior are also stupid.  Linda then gives an even more highly 
presupposing evaluation of stealing and other moral transgressions: they are “evil” (line 
389).  This casts Tyisha and Jasmine as defending something unforgivable. 
 
Tyisha continues to argue that one can courageously commit immoral acts.  But at line 
396 she chooses an example that does not seem well-designed to pursue an academic 
discussion.  “If I go shoot you in the head” is provocative, because of the second person 
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pronoun and because shooting someone is even more unethical than lying and stealing .  
By escalating the immorality of the topic, Tyisha seems to be pushing the discussion 
toward what Goffman (1974) called “flooding out”—bursting out of its character as an 
academic discussion and becoming simply an occasion for laughter or confrontation. 
 
Mrs. Bailey’s reaction at lines 399-403 frames Tyisha’s comments as an attempt to 
disrupt the classroom discussion.  Mrs. Bailey could have said: “that’s an interesting 
argument Tyisha, but how can an act be both virtuous and immoral at once? Would 
Aristotle have agreed with that?”  Instead, she skillfully frames Tyisha’s comment as 
moving against the will of the rest of the class, without baldly asserting her own authority.  
She starts at lines 399-401 by establishing her version of the contested issue as a 
“definition.”  Tyisha has argued that immoral acts can require courage, and this is a 
defensible position.  But Mrs. Bailey asserts that courage is something good, by definition.  
Tyisha and Jasmine “never bought into” this definition, “but the rest of us” did.  Tyisha 
and Jasmine, then, get positioned outside the teachers’ and others students’ group, as 
people who adopt idiosyncratic definitions and thus hinder the group discussion.  Mrs. 
Bailey acknowledges their dissent, and asks them to go along instead of imposing her will.  
It would violate her pedagogical philosophy to tell students what to think.  But in fact she 
has characterized Tyisha and Jasmine not only as outcasts, but also as the sort of people 
who refuse to accept agreed-upon definitions, and who thus disrupt the productive work 
that the rest of the class is pursuing. 
 
In this discussion of lying, stealing and shooting, then, Tyisha both embraces an 
oppositional identity and also skillfully manages to insert discussion of these illicit topics 
into discussion of the curriculum.  She both describes herself as and enacts an identity as 
clever and counter-hegemonic (or, from the teachers’ point of view, as annoying and 
disruptive)—thus creating a parallel between her narrated and her enacted identities. The 
teachers and other students follow Tyisha’s lead  and identify her as morally suspect.  
Their discussion excludes Tyisha from the group of teachers and other students in two 
ways.  First, Tyisha gets (willingly) described as the sort of person who would baldly lie to 
a friend’s mother, unlike the rest of them.  Second, she positions herself in the discussion, 
and gets positioned, as a student who makes jokes, takes the class off-topic, and refuses to 
accept generally agreed-upon definitions.  Her identity as a disruptive student thus gets 
further solidified—at Tyisha’s own initiative, but also with the help of the teachers and 
students. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
The teachers and students discussed several examples like this one across the 
academic year, in which Tyisha was both described and interactionally positioned as a 
disruptive student (cf. Wortham, 2003, for another case and Wortham, 2004, for another 
perspective on this same case; Wortham, in press, offers a detailed account of Tyisha and 
other students across the whole academic year).  These examples, together with explicit 
metapragmatic descriptions of her as disruptive, established this identity for Tyisha.  From 
September through November, she was a normal student.  But in December, January and 
February she increasingly became a disruptive one.  This social identification emerged in 
contrast to the macro and meso-level presuppositions about girls as more likely to succeed, 
and in this respect Tyisha’s identity was unexpected.   
 
Teachers and students did draw on macro and meso-level categories to identify Tyisha.  
The concept of a disruptive student presupposes well-established macro-level models of 
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appropriate classroom behavior and the authority of teachers, and the category of “loud 
black girls” also circulates more widely (Fordham, 1996).  Note, however, that all the 
students identified as cooperative, intelligent and promising in this classroom were also 
black girls.  In order to account for why Tyisha in particular was identified as disruptive, 
as opposed to all her black female peers, we need a more complex account that shows how 
macro-level categories were appropriated and transformed as teachers and students built 
local models of identity, and how these local models were presupposed in particular events 
of identification that involved Tyisha.  Tyisha’s trajectory of identification must be 
explored, across the months in which it emerged, not simply derived from macro-level 
patterns or individual micro-level events. 
 
Social identification, then, emerges across a trajectory of events.  There can be no 
general formul for how to explain the emergence of a social identity—one that explains all 
social identification in terms of certain timescales and processes.  In this case, local 
classroom models of identity played a central role, but only as part of a configuration 
including more widely circulating and shorter timescale events.  It is an empirical question 
in each case what configuration of timescales is relevant to explaining social identification. 
 
 
Appendix: Transcription Conventions 
 
'-' abrupt breaks or stops  
'?' rising intonation 
'.' falling intonation 
'_' (underline) stress 
(1.0) silences, timed to the nearest second 
'[' indicates simultaneous talk by two speakers, with one utterance  
represented on top of the other and the moment of overlap marked by 
left brackets 
'[…]' transcriber comment 
',' pause or breath without marked intonation 
'(hh)'  laughter breaking into words while speaking 
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